I divide Plato's discussion into three rounds, or, as they may well b� called, three waves of paradox, and discuss each in turn.
I
The First Round: Ethics, Politics, and the Form of the Good
Plato's discussion of the Form of the Good occurs in a section of Book VI which is concerned with the education of the rulers (SOOff). We are told that it is not sufficient for the rulers to learn what justice, temper ance, courage, and wisdom are, according to the definitions established in Book IV. These definitions do not provide a sufficient and exact understanding of these virtues. There is something greater than these virtues, and there is a "longer way".to understanding these things, a way that culminates in "the greatest study":
Gl
The greatest study is the study of the Form of the Good, by participation in which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial.
G2
If we do not know the·Form of the Good, then even if without such knowledge we know everything else, it (the knowledge of everything else) would be of no benefit to us, just as no possession would be (of benefit) without possession of the Good.
GJ If we know all things without knowing the Good, (this would be of no benefit because) we would not know (thap anything (is) beautiful and good.
Next Plato rejects two hypotheses concerning the nature of the Good:
The good is knowledge, and (b) the Good is pleasure. The first hypothesis is rejected on the ground that those who hold it are unable to answer the question "Knowledge of what?" except by saying "Knowledge of the Good", thus ending up with the circular and uninformative definition that the Good is knowledge of the Good. The second hypothesis is rejected on the ground that those who hold it admit that there are bad pleasures, and are thus compelled l----,.
-3 -to admit that the same things (bad pleasures) are both good and bad (presu mably a contradiction). Thus:
G4
The Good is not (identical with) knowledge or pleasure.
Plato concludes this round by asserting two propositions about good things and the Good and by emphasizing the importance of knowledge of the Good for the rulers:
GS
Many people prefer what appears to be just and honorable but is not, but no one prefers to pursue or possess what appears good but is not.
G6
The Good every soul .pursues and does everything for its sake divining what it is and yet baffled and not having an adequate apprehension of its nature nor a stable opinion about it as it has about other things, and because of this failing to have any benefit from other things.
G7
Our constitution will not be perfectly ordered unless the 1 rulers know how just and honorable things are good and they will not know this unless they know the Good.
This round is the least paradoxical of the three and the easiest to understand in the general setting of Plato's theory of Forms and his ethics.
The main metaphysical and epistemological assertions that Plato makes here about the Form of the Good are simply instances of his general metaphysics and epistemology.
Thus the second part of G1 is simply an instance of a general proposition that Plato holds, namely:
Fl It is by virtue of participation in the Form F-ness or the F that anything which is F is F .6
And G3 is an instance of the general epistemological proposition that goes together with the theory of Forms, namely:
F2
If we do not know F-ness or the F, we do not know that any thing is F. 7
Thus G3 and the second part of Gl do not assign to the Form of the Good any privileged position over other Forms.
On the other hand, the first part of Gl (and perhaps G2 and G7) does assign to the study of the Good a privileged position over all otehr studies and to the knowledge of the Good over all other knowledge. But this privileged position, so far, can be accounted for and understood by reference to G6, another standard Socratic and Platonic ethical view. If all our actions, pursuits, and undertakings are for the sake of the Good, then knowledge of the Good would indeed seem to be the most important knowledge we can have: for without it we would never know that anything for the sake of which we did anything else was good (by G3 Aristotle's; and 'the paradox and the difference would derive from his appli cation of Fl and F2 to the case of goodness. We might say that the conjunc tion of Gl, G3 and G6 assigns an ethical or practical priority to the study of the Good, and this priority might well have been thought sufficient for the paradox of the Philosopher-King.
II
The Second Round:
The Epistemological and Ontological Priority of the Form of the Good
The second round is a wave of paradox indeed: Plato seems to assign to the Form of the Good an ontological and epistemological priority over all other Forms.
The round (506B-509C) begins when Socrates is challenged to say what the Form of the Good is, if it is not knowledge or pleasure. Socrates implies that he does not know what the Form of the Good is, and when asked to
give at least his opinion he proposes to let go for the moment the question about, the nature of the Good and to speak of "the offspring of the Good which is most like it." He now prepares the ground for the simile of the Sun by first making the usual Platonic distinction between good things and beautiful thi�gs, objects of vision but not thought, on the one hand, and the Good itself and the Beautiful itself, objects of thought but not vision, on, the other.
In the case of vision and visible things a man may have the power of vision and a thing may be visible but there may be no actual vision (seeing) if a third element is not present, namely, light which is provided by the chief of the heavenly divinities, the Sun, "whose light makes the faculty of sight see best and visible things to be seen." (508A) Socrates now states and elaborates the simile as follows:
G8
As the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and to the objects of reason, so is the Sun in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.
G9
The Sun (by its light) gives the objects of sight their visibility and the faculty of sight its vision; similarly, the being "cogn itively reliable", in Vlastos' phrase; so that if we can understand how the Form of the Good is "the causeir of the ideal attributes, we will also be able to understand how it is "the cause" of the Forms' knowability. Let us take a brief look at these contrast s.
In the �· 211AB Plato says that unlike the many beautiful (sensible)
things that participate in it, Beauty itself always exists, it is neither generated nor destroyed, it does not increase or decrease, and exists by itself. Moreover, in contrast to sensible beautiful things, Beau. ty itself is not beautiful in one respect (or part) and ugly in another, nor beautiful at one time and not another, nor beautiful by comparison to one thing and ugly by comparison to another, nor beautiful here and ugly there being beautiful for some and ugly for others. Let us refer to the two sets of attributes of the Form Beauty listed (or implied) in the above two sentences as "Il" and "I2" ("I" for "Ideal attributes")
respectively. Now in the Rep. Bk. V Plato tells us several times (477A, 478D, 478E, 479A-C) that the objects of knowledge, the Forms, "are" whereas the objects of belief, the sensibles that participate in Forms, "both are and are not."
Professor Vlastos has argued convincingly, I think, that it is not existence that is being asserted here of the Forms (and asserted and denied of sensibles), but rather perfection or complete reality; and this in turn is to be interpreted in terms of our second set of the ideal attributes (I2) listed in the Symposium.
To say of the Form Circle (or Justice) that it "is" whereas a sensible circle "is and is not" is to say that the Form Circle is always circular (just), is circular (just) in all respects or parts, is circular (just) no matter what it is compared to, and is circular (just) to all who apprehend it no matter from hwere; whereas a sensible circle (a just man) is sometimes circular (just) and sometimes not, and so on. As Vlastos points out, Plato himself expands the "is and is not" formula in some of these ways at 479A-C for the cases of beautiful things, just things, pious things, doubles, halves, great and small things, light and heavyt O In all these contrasts Plato surely intends to bring into relief "the being and essence (reality)" of the Forms, and he does it in terms of our ideal attributes Il and I2. Moreover, in the Rep. Bk. V, sensibles.are unknow able and can be only objects of belief precisely because they lack the ideal attri butes of the Forms; ll and this supports our answer to our second question, Q2, that it is the ideal attributes of the Forms that make possible the knowability of the Forms.
In sum, and in answers to Ql and Q2, the being and essence (reality) of the Forms consists of their ideal attributes (Il and 12), and an object must have these to be knowable.
Let us now go to our third and more difficult question (Q3), assuming the answers that we just gave to Ql and Q2. Let us first tackle part of Q3:
in what sense of "cause" can we plausibly suppose that the Form of the Good is the cause of the ideal attributes (being and essence) of the Forms?
In the case of the Sun and sensible things, the Sun is presumably the (an) efficient cause of their generation and growth and nurture (as well as their visibility).
But there is no generation and growth and nurture in the case of the Forms, nor are the This is our interpretation of the relevant part of Gll.
We are now within sight of an answer to the more difficult part of Q3, the part concerning the nature of the Form of the Good. For it seems to follow from Gll.l and the distinction between proper and ideal attributes that Gl2 The ideal attributes of all the Forms other than the Form of the Good are proper attributes of the Form of the Good.
A host of questions now face us. I will list and discuss them in an order that may help us answer them. Q 4 Why should Plato think that the Form of the Good, rather than some other Form or no Form at all, is the formal cause of the ideal attributes of all the other Forms?
QS Did Plato conflate reality and goodness, as the joining of the present interpretation with Vlastos' interpretation of the doctrine of degrees of reality would seem to imply? Q6 What is the distinction between ideal and proper attributes, and did Plato make or at least observe it so that we are justified in attributing Gl2 to him partly on the basis of it? Q7 How is the goodness of sensible objects to be accounted for on the present interpretation?
These are large and difficult question and I can only hope to indicate in outline what I think are the right answers.
We can begin to see a connection between goodness and the ideal attri butes of the Forms if we assume one of Plato's standard ways of conceiving the Forms in the middle dialogues, that is, if we think of the Forms not as proper ties but as ideal examplars complete with non-Pauline self-predication.13 On this assumption, each Form is the best object of its kind there is or can be. The Form Circle, for example, is the best circle there is or can be, the Form Justice the best (most) just thing there is or can be. Now Plato thinks, I believe, that it is by virtue of its ideal attributes that each Form (other than the Form of the Good) is the best object of its kind. Let us take the examples of Circle and Justice, a mathematical and an ethical Form, and try to see this connection with each of the four ideal attributes 12. It is the ideal attribute of being circular in every respect or part of itself that makes the Form circle a perfect circle or the best circle there is or can be; it is pre cisely the lack of this attribute that makes sensible circles imperfect circles, "in contact with the straight everywhere11.1 4 Again, the ideal attribute of being circular no matter compared to what assures us that there is no circle relative to which the Form circle is not or is less circular. On the other hand, it is more difficult, as Keyt has noted,15 to see a connection between being always circular and the superlative goodness of kind of the Form Circle. Actu ally, there are connections here and there from which Plato may have over generalized:
for example, we count durability or high degree of resistance to .i radigm of its kind, the best object of its kind to know. And the same seems · true of the fourth ideal attribute, being circular to all who apprehend it no from where.
It.seems then that the first two ideal attributes of the Form Circle contribute to its being the best circle there is or can be, and the And from Gll.l and Gl3, it seems that we can derive the proposition:
Gl4
It is by virtue of participating in the Form of the Good that all the other Forms are the best objects of their kind and the best objects of their kind to know.
Thus the Form of the Good is, as it should be, the formal cause of the superla tive goodness of kind of all the other Forms.
We can see, perhaps in a short circuit way, that this proposition is on the right track, from a Platonic point of view, on the assumption that the Forms (other than the Good) are ideal exem plars: for on this assumption the forms have something in common, namely, their being the best objects of their kind; so it is natural that there should be a Form in virtue of which they have this in common, and in view of what this common feature is, it is natural that the Form would be the Good.
But now, having seen how it is appropriate for the Good to be the formal cause of the superlative goodness of kind of the Forms, we are faced with the question (raised by QS) 0£. how it is that it is also appropriate for the Good to be the formal cause of the superlative reality of kind of the Forms. For on Vlastos' interpretation of the doctrine of degrees of reality, which I believe is generally accurate, it is by virtue of (what we have called) .their ideal at tributes that the Forms are the most real objects of therr kind. And from this and Gll.l it seems that we can derive the proposition
Gl5
It is by virtue of participation in the Form of the Good that all the other Forms are the most real objects of their kind (or, have superlative reality of kind).
The answer to our question is, I believe, that here we do have a "conflation" of superlative reality of kind and superlative goodness of kind.
For it is by virtue of the very same ideal attributes, it seems, that a Form is both the best object of its kind and the most real object of its kind. Thus the super lative goodness of a given kind and the superlative reality of the same kind coincide, not only in the sense that the best and most real objects of a given kind are one and the same, .. i.e., the Form of that kind, but also in the stronger sense that it is the very same ideal attributes of a Form that constitute both its superlative reality and its superlative goodness of kind. But heie we must be careful when we speak of "conflation": Vlastos has argued successfully, I
believe, that Plato distinguishes between reality and existence; the above conflation does not by itself imply a confusion of existence and goodness. The theory, so far at least, does not sanction an inference from the fact that some thing exists to an attribution of goodness to it; it is not, not yet at least, in viblation of the Humean dictum that one cannot derive "ought" (value) from "is" (fact) alone.
In any case I doubt that Plato was ever tempted to draw the should be good that a certain state of affairs obtain (e.g. that the moon and the planets should move in certain ways) to the conclusion that it does actually obtain. But, in any case, the logical source of such an inference would not be only the present conflation of superlative reality and superlative goodness, but also Plato's hypothesis that the physical world was fashioned by a divine craftsman, who was completely good and unenvious, using the perfect Forms as his models. Thus, from the point of view of the autonomy of ethics --the logical independence of goodness and rightness from brute facts --the present conflation of goodness and reality is harmless. But the conflation of course does imply that, if there are degrees of goodness as there must be and degrees of reality as indeed there are in Plato's theory, the better a thing of a given kind is the more real a thing of that kind it is and conversely.
Ideal and Proper Attributes
To make further progress we need now to go to Q 6 , the question con cerning the distinction between proper and ideal attributes. This distinction is crucial to our interpretation for a number of reasons, two of which are as follows: first, we answered the question concerning "the being and essence" of the Forms in terms of the ideal attributes of the Forms, which of course pre supposes the distinction; second, we attributed to Plato Gl2 partly on the basis of this distinction, and Gl2 itself is stated in terms of the distinction, so that we can hardly understand what Gl2 tells us about the nature of the Form of the Good unless we understand the distinction. Moreover, one would think that, as Keyt has pointed out,17 the distinction seems a necessary one for
Plato to draw or at least observe; or, at any rate, it would be a useful one "is beautiful in on e way (or, in one respect), ugly in another", and says that "the Aristotelian formula establishes the P-distinction at the price of losing this very feature of the Idea, allowing it to be P and not-P but in different respects, P F, not-P F".
(QE_. Cit. , p. 331.) Now this is a case where, on Vlastos' own interpretation, 21 the Form Beauty is conceived by Plato as being non-Pauline self-predicational, i.e. the Form Beauty is beautiful, so this objection if correct ·cuts across our argument concerning (1).
But on the present construction of "qua" as "because" I do not think that the objection is sound: to allow that the attribute P belong to the Form F qua F and does not belong to the Form F qua Form is not necessarily to allow that the Form F is P in one respect and not-P in another respect; for on the present interpre tation of "qua" as "because" the negation sign goes in front of the whole "because" clause, not in front of the . attribute sign "P". What is denied is not that P belongs to the Form of F, but only that P belongsto the Form F because it is a Form; and the latter denial is perfectly compatible with P belonging to Form it is and also that it is at rest (invariant) because it is a Form.
I conclude, then, that the distinction between ideal and proper attributes is perfectly compatible with the ontology of Plato's theo ry of Forms, provided that we conceive of the Forms as ideal exemplars with self-p redication, and provided that we interpret "qua" as "because". Here I must make it expli cit that I am not maintaining that Plato always and consistentl y conc eived of the Forms as ideal exemplars with self-predication.
I am only maintaini ng that sometimes he so conceived them, and in particular that he so conceive d them in the middle dialogues and in conjunction with his theory of goodness in the Republic.
.We shall presently see that this conception seems indeed essential to this theory of the Form of the Good.
We are now free to take up the question whether Plato ever made ex plicitly the distinction between proper and ideal attributes --which he never did, or (the more interesting question) whether he observed the distinction in practice in the sense that his expressed views and arguments are consistent with it.
This question is related to our question Q7, how the goodness of sensible things is to be accounted for on the theory of the Form of the Good as we inter preted it. Now Keyt has produced striking evidence that Plato confused ideal and proper attributes of Forms. He says:
Although Aristotle, in commenting on the theory of Forms, draws this very distinction, there is striking evidence that Plato himself overlooked it. The evidence, apart from his silence on the matter, consists in some bad mistakes that he would have been unlikely to make if he had seen it.
(Keyt, (1), p. 23U)
The "bad mistakes" consist in certain inferences that Plato makes in the Timaeus from certain Forms, used as models, having certain features to their sensible copies having these features. The general context is familiar. The divine craftsman (the Dimiurge), being good and unenvious, wishes to make the sensible world as good as possible; to do this he takes the Forms as his models and tries to fashion the sensible world after the Forms as much as possible (that is, I
suppose, as much as is possible given the defective nature of matter). In particular the dimiurge copies the Form of living creature. This Form, Keyt says, "has only one feature that a sane craftsman would copy, having a soul and a body" (a proper attribute of the Form); but "the Dimiurge is not content to stop here. He notices that his model is unique, timeless, and generic, and proceeds to copy these attributes" (presumably ideal attributes).
(p. 232.)
In the case of the first of these latter attributes, Keyt quotes Timaeus 3la2-5
Plato's argument is this: the cosmos was made according to its model; its model is unique; therefore, the ccismos is unique.
If Plato accepts this argument, he should also accept the fol lowing one, which within his system has true premises and a �e are now in the happy or unhappy position to show that, given our interpretation of the Form of the Good in the Republic, Plato "had" to make these "curious mistakes" and his divine craftman "had" to be "mad". We are assuming that in the Timaeus, when Plato was making these "curious mistakes", the Forms are still conceived as ideal exemplars with self-predication --the best objects of their kind --for why else would the Dimiurge copy them if he wished to make sensible things as good as possible?
And the position is happy for our interpretation since it provides evidence for it, but unhappy for Plato if the inferences are the "bad mistakes" Keyt seems to show them to be.
To see why it is that Plato had to make the "curious mistakes" and why his Dimiurge had to be "mad", on the interpretation we have given of the Form of the Good, let us go to our question Q7:
on this interpretation how is the goodness of sensible things to be accounted for? Let us work with three kinds of examples, a mathematical Form, Circle, a "natural kind" Form, Living
Creature, and an ethical Form, Justice.
To be a circle or circular a sensible must participate in the Form Circle, and this is participation in the proper attributes of the Form, namely being circular (and perhaps to all those attri butes being entailed by this proper attribute, e.g. being a figure) . But to be a good circle (to some degree) a sensible, on the interpretation we have given, must participate (to some degree) in the ideal attributes of the Form Circle:
for. on that interpretation, it is the ideal attributes of the Form Circle that constitute its superlative goodness and it is by virtue of having these ideal attributes that the Form Circle participates in the Form of the Good. Parti cipation merely in the proper attributes of the Form circle (to some degree, if degrees of participation in proper attributes is allowed) would have no tendency to show that the sensible is a good circle (to some degree), for there is not "mad" for doing so, he would be "mad" --or rather futile --if hd didn't! Correspondingly, "the curious mistakes" and the "bad arguments" of Plato should begin to appear less curious and not as bad: for we are now to understand the theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic as an implicit premise(s) in these arguments. For example, the argument "from eternity" would be more complicated roughly perhaps as follows: the Form of Living Creature is the Best living creature there is or can be; it is by virtue of being eternal (among other things, or "eternal" standing for a summary of its ideal attributes) that it is the best object of its kind and it is by virtue of this that it participates in the Form of the Good; therefore, if one wishes to fashion a sensible living creature as good as possible one must copy the "eternity" of the Form as much as possible. 22
Of course I am speaking here to the validity of Plato's argument, not its sound ness --but this is the point to which Keyt is speaking and certainly part of Vlastos' "curious". The soundness of the argument is quite another matter, for this depends on the truth of the theory that according to me is the theoretical backbone of the argument. For the present we may note, in addition that Plato or his craftsman would never make the mad mistakes of some of Keyt's illustra tions, for example, the mistake of making a paper shield and justifying himself on the ground that his pattern (model) was of paper (p. 231). Far from sanc tioning such mistakes the theory excludes them wholsesale: for no sensible ob ject is a reliable model, certainly never the best model, for making a good object of a kind; only the best objects of a kind are, the ideal exemplars, the Forms; sensible objects are copies or copies of copies. The "paperness" of the "model" paper shield, far from making the best shield there is or can be, makes it one of the worst --a point we can accept. Of course Keyt was only illustrating in this passage the type of mistake he is attributing to Plato ---he was not saying that Plato or his Di.mi.urge would make this mistake. But now we can see why they wouldn't. If we construct a parallel argument, to the one we have recon structed above about "eternity", but with ahy sensible object as the model, the theoretical premises of this argumentwould be false for Plato: for him no sen sible object is the best object of its kind; and far from the ideal attributes of material objects --their materiality, their variable nature --being what makes them the best objects of their kind, they are precisely what makes them irremediably defective.
Here we can begin to see where the fault really lies --in Plato's theory. It lies in the combination of the conception of Forms as self-predi cational with the theory of goodness, the theory that the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the ideal attributes of the Forms and that it is by virtue of these that the Forms are the best objects of their kind. Without self-pre dication this theory of goodness would collapse; for without it the Forms would not be ideal exemplars --the best objects of their kind --and so there would be no motivation at all for supposing that the Form of the Good is the formal cause of the being and the essence of the Forms.23 But why is this combination faulty? For one thing, it seems to imply all the absurdities of non-Pauline self-predication. To be the best possible shield --the best object of its kind �-a thing would have to be both a Form and a shield, an immaterial shield!
Can there be such a thing? And would it be the best possible shiled? For another, the theory seems inadequate as a theory of goodness, for it seems to imply that proper attributes are irrelevant to the goodness of a thing. Can this be correct? Even according to Plato's other theory of goodness in the Republic, the theory of virtue and function of the first book, a shield is a good shield insofar as it performs its function well; and surely this has to do with its size and shape, its balance, its weight and degree of impenetrability 24
--all apparently proper attributes; whereas, according to the theory of the Form of the Good, the goodness of the sensible shield depends only on the degree to which it resembles the ideal attributes of the Form Shield --its invariance indestructibility, its always being a shiled, its being a shield in every respect, and so on. Moreover, in the case of certain ethical Forms, Plato seems to hold a strong connection between their proper attributes and the Form of the Good.
For him, being a just man (or, a just city) entails being a good man (o� a good city). But being just is certainly a proper attribute of the Form Justice.
So in addition to the connection between the ideality of the Form Justice and the Form of the Good (a connection which is the same as that between the idealiy of any Form and the Form of the Good), there is also a strong entailment con nection between the proper attribute of the Form, being just, an the Form of the Good.
This, it appears, is as it should be (I mean, there ought to be such a connection). But if so, it seems to contradict the theory of the Form of the Good we have expounding; or at any rate, if this is so, the Form of the Good cannot conssit just in the ideality common to all the Forms. And in the latter case why should we suppose that the goodness entailed by being just is the same as the goodness by virtue of which all the Forms are the best objects of their kind, or that there is even any connection between the two? The goodness en tailed by being just is probably the functional goodness mentioned earlier; for it is on the basis of the theory of function and virtue that the definitions of just city and just man are framed. But how this theory of functional good ness is connected with the theory of the Form of the Good is not clear. Now we can speculate that it is pretty unlikely that somebody would see this point unless he drew the distinction between proper and ideal attributes expli citly and asked himself to which genus the three types of attributes (11, 12, and proper) Jl.ie n:tapil :tha:t :thJl.ie aisJl.ie naispiblJl.ie ais arJl.ie Froramais i(a mpara i'llJl.ie l rJl.ie aisul:t :tro :thJl.ie rJl.ie aisul:t ro:f :thJl.ie arguamJl.ie n:t pin :thJl.ie ParamJl.ie npidJl.ie ais i132c954-ll amJl.ie n:tpironJl.ie d by KJl.ie y:t) .
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Cooper also says, seems to me dubious. The theory requires, rather, that mathe matical Forms, at any rate insofar as they are thought of as the best objects of their kind and the best objects of their kind to know, are conceived in terms of it.
III
The Third Round or Wave of Paradox:
The Divided Line
The third wave or paradox is the simile of the divided line, especially the statements that Plato makes about the upper two portions of the line (Rep.
509C-511E).
Though the Form of the Good is not explicitly mentioned in this section (except perhaps implicitly at 509D as the thing that "rules over the intelligible kind and region"), there is universal agreement among the commen tators that the Form of the Good is at the top of the ontological division of the line and knowledge of the Good at the top of the epistemological division, and there is no reason to doubt that this is indeed meant, especially as this harmonizes with the previous simile of the sun and the following allegory of the cave. We are not concerned here with the whole of the divided line and a complete interpretation of it, but only with the relations, ontological and epistemological, between the upper two portions of the line, the mathematical and the dialectical.
Plato begins by characterizing these two portions as follows:
... there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as image s the things imitated in the former division, and by means of hypotheses from which it pro
ceeds not up to a first principle but down to a confusio11 while 
An immence amount has been written on these passages. Here I wish only to dispute two widely accepted points of interpretation and suggest an alternative interpretation which is the natural outcome of the second round.
Both points seem crucial in understanding the epistemology of the divided line and the epistemological priority of the Form of the Good.
-21-
The first point I wish to dispute is that Plato's point in calling the beginning of mathematics "hyp otheses" is that they are underived, or un They are beginnings of mathematics, but they are not beginnings(s) of knowledge;
and for this reason, the propositions they validly derive from them, the theorems, are also not really known.
As to whether the mathematicians realize this, Plato's text seems ambiguous; he says they regard them "as known", "give no account of them", supposing "they are obvious to everybody". (SlOC) But he seems clear that dialectic "does not consider the hypotheses beginnings but really hypotheses" (SllB); that is, they are not considered by the dialectician as beginnings of knowledge but really unknown. How knowledge of the Form of the Good --which is the correct beginning of knowledge --helps to convert these unknown hypotheses into knowledge, we will take up presently.
The second major point of interpretation I wish to dispute, a point that goes naturally with the firdt point, is that Plato holds that once we (doing dialectic) have reached the Form of the Good and have knowledge of it, we can deduce or derive from this knowledge the hypotheses of the mathematicians.
This idea goes naturally with the first point we disputed, since such a deduc tion would r:emedy_ the alleged defect of the hypotheses of the mathematicians. This theory has at least one virtue: it is difficult to see how anyone who were acquainted (with the "mind's eye") with such entities would make a mistake about them; at any rate a whole set of mistakes due to variability and spatial location (in the case of physical objects) has been summarily excluded (though it is difficult to see how purely Plato says that they regard their hypotheses as known and obvious to everybody and give no account of them. What sort of "being known" and "obviousness" is he talking about? I think the "obvious ness" of the visible figures; it is the visible illustrations that would make the hypotheses "obvious to everyone", precisely the things that, in Plato's theory, could not make the hypotheses knowledge. And what sort of "account" is it that the mathematicians do not give of their hypotheses? I argued that he does not mean that they are underived; and I think he does not mean that they do not give definitions of the concepts they use, for surely they did construct definitions and Euclid's Elements (much later of course) begins with definitions. I think he means that they give not epistemological account of the sorts of objects they want their hypotheses to be about, not the visible figures, but their models.
They do not, for example, ask themselves and seek to answer the question, What sort of objects must the objects our hypotheses are about be if our hypotheses are to be always true? They they have no theory of the objects their hypotheses mu8t he about if they are to he always true and to constitute knowledge.
B�caune of their practice of using sensible figures they are liable to error or at nny rate they are not assured freedom of error. Because of this practice they also are not in a position to �'see" the objects of their hypotheses "in splendid isolation" from sensible figures and begin to appreciate their nature.
And also because, as mathematicians at least, they do not raise the above type ·of questions, they lack a theory of objects proper to mathematics. is to be a Form. And if at any rate he has Plato's conception of knowledge, a cardinal tenet of which is that to be known an object must always be the same, etc., the dialectician would see that only the Forms are possible object of know ledge; and that if mathematics is to be knowledge, mathematical hypotheses must be about only such objects. Thus what the super science of dialectic would do for mathematics is not to provide a super general known basis from which mathe matical hypotheses (the beginning of mathematics) can be deduced, but rather a theory of objects that mathematical hypotheses (as well as the theorems) must be about if mathematics is to be knowledge. Such a theory would "free" mathematics from sensible figures in the sense that according to it the senstible figures are never evidence that the hypotheses are always true or known, but only images or illustrations or sensible participants of the objects the hypotheses are about.
Plato's theory of Forms with the Form of the Good at the top serves mathematics by postulating the very objects that, according to Plato at least, mathematics needs to be about if it is to be knowledge.
What is the moral of our story? I think it is that the theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic is truly and coherently the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato's meta physics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art.
The Form of the Good serves his metaphysics by bringing into relief the very ideality of the Forms, the eternal order and stability of the entities that must exist if this world is not to be a "vast sea of dissimilarity." It serves his epistemology by bringing into relief the knowability of the Forms, the attributes the Forms must have if there is to be knowledge.
The Form of the Good serves his ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art, by bringing into relief the superlative goodness of the Forms, the features that must be imitated if the imitations are to have any value.
In his theory of the Form of the Good Plato was truly the first grand philosophical synthesiser.
If to achieve such a grand synthesis he had to employ a few unholy combinations, such as the combination of reality, goodness, and self-predication, he may perhaps be forgiven --at least if he is understood.
A minor moral, I hope, is that when Plato looked into "the orb of light" he really did see something.
And it is a tribute, perhaps ironic, to his artistry, so evident in the three great similies, that when many others looked into the same orb of light through Plato's telescope they were warmed and elevated even though, apparently, they saw nothing.
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